Poland’s foreign policy stance, matters of importance to the European Union, and its domestic political situation are also significant for Latvia. Poland has been important to us and our country in the distant past, throughout the 20th century, and remains so today – as a nation with a history similar to and intertwined with our own, as an ally during our War of Independence, and in the current geopolitical landscape. Therefore, as the elections in Poland approach on 15 October, it is worth looking at several key issues, such as climate policy, energy transition, carbon emissions in Polish industrial sectors, and topical environmental aspects in relation to European Union requirements and the approach to them as a whole.
Currently, there is a consensus across the entire political spectrum in Poland on the necessity of an energy transition, which, even a few years ago, was by no means an easy process to implement. There are still major differences regarding the pace and details of this transition. It has been suggested that, ahead of the parliamentary elections on 15 October, Poland's transition is like a “boat without oars”: reality either exceeds government plans (for example, the installed capacity of solar panels) or fails to meet them (for example, the Prime Minister's promise to have one million electric vehicles in the country by 2025). The new government faces difficult decisions regarding the future of the coal mining industry, keeping energy prices at an acceptable level, and the implementation of EU legislation Fit for 55 to meet the European Union's 2030 climate targets.
Important to know
In 2021, Poland was “responsible” for approximately 12% of all European Union (EU) GHG emissions. Since reaching a peak in the 1980s, carbon emissions have fallen by more than 30%. The bulk of this reduction is linked to the 1990s, following the collapse of the Soviet bloc and the transition away from a planned industrial economy. Since 2001, emission levels have not changed significantly. Poland's current greenhouse gas emission reduction target for the EU by 2030 (for domestic transport, buildings, agriculture, small-scale industry, and waste) is 17.7% compared to 2005. This is much lower than in Germany or Denmark (50%); Poland's total emissions in 2021 were a pressing issue.
Poland's total emissions in 2021 were actually slightly higher than in 2005
Since electricity generation in Poland is heavily dependent on coal, the country's energy sector has the highest carbon intensity of all European Union sectors, making the cessation of coal mining and usage one of its primary tasks. The Polish energy sector is dominated by large, fully or partially state-owned enterprises, such as the oil group Orlen or Polska Grupa Energetyczna (PGE) – an energy company that owns coal-fired power plants and mines.
The United Right (PiS/ZP) coalition government came to power in 2015. One of its slogans was the protection of the coal mining industry. While this party has partially supported the need for an energy transition and certain climate-friendly policy areas, it remains highly sceptical of the EU Green Deal and the Fit for 55 programme.
Poland has managed to diversify its gas, oil, and coal supplies, ending its significant dependence on Russian imports. However, it must be emphasised that the total volume of subsidies required to keep gas and electricity prices low will cost the state tens of billions of euros. Electricity costs may rise not only due to fuel prices but also because of the EU ETS (a fundamental element of the EU's climate change policy and the main instrument for cost-effective reduction of greenhouse gas emissions), which is becoming an increasing burden on an energy system reliant on coal usage.
Regarding the impact of climate change in Poland, the main problems are caused by droughts, which threaten agriculture and forestry, both of which are vital to the Polish economy. Air pollution is also a problem, caused not only by cars but also by coal-fired furnaces. No other EU country uses so much coal for heating.
Key examples of energy transition
The coal burden – “coal energy” is the most difficult issue hindering Poland’s transition period. According to official government plans, Poland will be the last EU country to use coal for electricity production, with this planned until the 2040s. As power plants age and state funding dries up, many coal power plants will close early. The consequence is a potential interruption in Poland’s electricity production. Transition plans have been developed for coal mining and usage regions, but not all will receive EU funding – lignite mines in the Turów region were not approved for European Union support because coal mining there is planned until 2044. Conversely, Bełchatów, which hosts the largest lignite power plant in Europe and is planned for closure in the 2030s, will receive funding. With the rising CO₂ price in the EU ETS, the use of coal is driving up electricity prices.
Battery powerhouse – Poland is not among the leading automobile manufacturers in the EU, but there is one sector that can benefit from the shift to electric vehicles: battery production. As of April 2023, Poland was the country with the second-largest lithium-ion battery production capacity in the world (even surpassing the USA). The industry believes that the growth in electric vehicle production and energy storage represents a massive development opportunity.
The transition to nuclear energy – despite efforts dating back to the 1970s, Poland has been unable to build a nuclear power plant. The first initiative in 1971 reached the construction phase, but plans collapsed with the demise of the Soviet bloc and protests against the plant's construction. A more recent project, launched in 2009, stalled at an early stage. Currently, the nuclear power plant project has progressed the furthest; its technological partner is the US company Westinghouse, and the opening is planned for 2033. Another notable public-private project is a partnership with the Korean company KHNP. The state oil company Orlen plans to build a small modular reactor (SMR) unit by 2030. Over the coming decades, Poland expects to establish more than 70 such nuclear power generation units.
Solar energy – while the increase in wind energy capacity has stalled due to the adoption of unfavourable legislation, solar photovoltaic capacity has grown rapidly from negligible (in 2018) to more than 14 GW (in 2023). Both through rooftop solar energy and utility-scale projects, 10% of electricity was provided in the first eight months of 2023 (compared to 5.7% in 2022). But... this situation has pushed the ageing electricity grid system to its maximum capacity. As a result, thousands of projects have been denied grid connections due to outdated regulations or simply because the grid could not handle the excess electricity. The situation is set to be remedied by the adoption of new legislative amendments (introducing solutions such as cable pooling, etc.).
Conflicts with the EU – both terms of the incumbent coalition government have been characterised by various conflicts with the EU and its institutions. These have centred on the rule of law and environmental protection issues, as Poland has objected to part of the EU Green Deal legislation. For instance, in the summer of 2023, it announced that it would challenge components of the Fit for 55 package (such as the ban on internal combustion engines, etc.) in the EU High Court. This move was described by Euractiv as a political bluff. This description, of course, did not please the Polish government or a portion of the population. The conflict over the rule of law has frozen billions from the EU pandemic recovery fund, blocking money for so-called “green investments.”
Heating problems – 16 million Poles heat their homes using district heating in the winter. This is the largest number of district heating customers of any EU country. Most district heating systems use coal and are considered inefficient. Experts claim that this sector is underinvested, outdated, and unprofitable. Customers are suffering from rising costs.
Expensive heat pumps – in 2022, the volume of heat pump installations increased as many saw them as a solution to the rising prices of coal and heating in general. Now, residents are starting to regret this decision as energy costs rise. The Polish government agreed to freeze electricity prices, but only up to a certain level of energy consumption. Industry organisations have urged the government to make an exception, but no decision has been made yet. Polish media report that the demand for heat pumps is declining.
Changes in the consumption of plant-based products – it is still too early to talk about a “vegan revolution”, but despite the popularity of meat products, the market for plant-based products in Poland is growing rapidly. In 2021, the market value reached 1.5 billion zloty (336 million euros). Within a year, it had nearly doubled. Surveys show that just over 8% of Poles are vegan or vegetarian, but 38% state that they are trying to reduce their meat consumption. Even well-known and recognised Polish meat brands are now offering plant-based “kabanosy” (a popular type of dry sausage in Poland).
Land use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF)
Forests remain important carbon sinks. In 2021, 21 million tonnes of CO₂ equivalent were removed by them. Approximately 30% of Poland's territory is covered by forests (similar figures are found in France and Germany). About 80% of these belong to the state and are managed by the state enterprise “State Forests of Poland”. The State Forests company generated record-high revenue from timber sales in 2022, totalling 13.5 billion zloty. In recent years, the company has received criticism from NGOs and private individuals on several issues, ranging from a lack of transparency in management and administration to logging in old-growth forest areas.
Over the past decade, the volume of CO₂ sequestration in forests has decreased. In recent years, it has fallen sharply (from more than 40 million tonnes to just over 20 million tonnes). According to Poland's emissions report, the main reasons are related to the long-term effects of various natural disasters, such as persistent droughts and storms, which have caused significant damage to forests.
Timber extraction is increasing
The Polish government has pointed to forest sequestration as a climate solution, including during the COP24 event in Poland. It must be admitted that the level of sequestration has decreased. In 2021, it reached only 52% of Poland's set target for 2030. The solution proposed by the State Forests of Poland to address this problem has, unfortunately, had little impact.
The government and “State Forests of Poland” have criticised the EU Nature Restoration Law and other EU projects aimed at improving forest protection. Józef Kubica, Director of the State Forests company (a ZP/PiS candidate in the 2023 elections), stated in 2021 that the EU goals for forest protection would drastically reduce current forest management practices, particularly (timber) extraction volumes. From timber sales in 2022, the “State Forests of Poland” company had record annual revenue of 13.5 billion zloty (3 billion euros). This is a very significant sum that flowed into the state budget. Clearly, the “State Forests of Poland” and the Polish government would not wish to reduce revenue volumes due to the conditions of the EU's new environmental policy.
Sectoral indicators:
Industry
In 2021, 14% of Poland’s total GHG emissions; accounts for approximately 5% of Poland's GDP and 400,000 jobs. The energy intensity of industry (per unit of GDP) is higher than the EU average, and companies are increasingly trying to improve efficiency and use carbon-free energy in the form of both renewable energy resources and small nuclear reactors.
In Poland, CO₂-intensive industrial sectors include both private domestic and international companies (such as ArcelorMittal) and partially state-owned companies (such as Orlen and Grupa Azoty).
Energy-intensive industrial sectors struggled with high electricity and gas price increases in 2022. The energy sector's high carbon intensity not only drives up prices but also increasingly threatens their business as more people pay attention not only to the price but also to CO₂ emissions.
Buildings
Buildings account for 11% of all GHG emissions in Poland.
The heating sector is dominated by solid fuels (coal, wood) and district heating (primarily coal-fired power plants), with the use of gas boilers increasing in recent years; they are now in a quarter of all buildings (according to incomplete government data).
Due to the energy crisis, the sales volume of heat pumps has increased rapidly, though they still account for a small fraction of all installed heating systems.
Until recently, Poles burned 87% of all coal consumed by households in the EU. Nearly two-thirds of Polish buildings are characterised by low energy efficiency. Because of the energy crisis, the government suspended the application of quality requirements for coal sold to households in 2022 (this was extended in May 2023).
The current Polish government's targets are as follows: a gradual phase-out of coal use in urban households by 2030 and outside cities by 2040, with all heating provided by “low-emission sources” or district heating by 2040 (though experts point out that this could be achieved much faster). The building renovation strategy sets a target to renovate and insulate 236,000 buildings per year between 2020 and 2030. This number is set to grow in the coming decades.
Polish cities have some of the worst air quality levels in Europe. Buildings (primarily those heated by solid fuel furnaces) are the largest source of fine particulate pollution. Almost 16 billion zloty (3.6 billion euros) in the government's “Clean Air” programme is earmarked for replacing household heat sources. Until 2022, it was possible to receive a subsidy for more efficient coal furnaces.
Mobility
Domestic transport accounts for 17.8% of total GHG emissions. It is the only sector whose emissions increased between 1990 and 2021.
In 2019, the government adopted a strategy for the sustainable development of transport until 2030. It assumes that by 2030, CO₂ emissions from transport will increase by 8% (compared to 2017); there is no specific target for the number of electric vehicles.
As indicated in Poland’s energy policy, the government wants to achieve “zero-emission” levels in public transport in major cities by 2030. The then-Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki announced in 2016 that there would be one million electric vehicles in Poland by 2025, but so far, there are fewer than 50,000 electric vehicles on Polish roads. Transport is the transition area for which the current right-wing government has campaigned most vocally, promoting electromobility. A state-led project for the Polish electric vehicle brand “Izera” was initiated. Poland is an EU leader in freight road transport, but if a transition to zero-emission freight vehicles is not implemented, this sector risks being left out of the European market.
Currently, Poland is the largest producer of lithium-ion batteries in Europe and the second-largest in the world (after China).
* Energy transition is the transition from fossil energy production and consumption systems, including oil, natural gas, and coal, to renewable energy sources, such as wind and solar energy