People talk about national ideology incessantly. In France, in England, and first and foremost, of course, in Russia (unfortunately, I do not know how things are in Latvia). But what is it – a national ideology? There is not enough space here for a detailed answer. I will limit myself to saying: national ideology consists of thoughts, ideas, and principles that those in power in a given national society wish to pass off as the thoughts, ideas, and principles of the society itself. Whether that is actually the case is another question. Yet, to some extent, it must be so, if only by accepting that a so-called "democratic society" has, one way or another, wanted to be governed by precisely these people in power. However, for a national ideology to exist, one more very important condition is necessary: a "minimum" of national self-awareness that allows the individuals forming that nation to think and speak of themselves not only as the aforementioned individuals, but also as English, Latvian, Russian, or Chinese—that is, as persons whose lives are determined not only by their individual traits and goals, but also by the traits and goals of their national community.

It is interesting, however, that current discussions about almost any national ideology usually narrow down to the question of why such an ideology does not exist and how it might be created. It turns out that answering this question is extremely difficult.

In modern-day England, ideology began to be formulated—and not just by the right, but also (strangely!) by the Labour Party currently in power—in terms of values. These were, of course, primarily the "traditional" values of the British middle class. And here, it goes without saying, family comes first. But one cannot get by with just family. Especially because, in the opinion of both right-wing and left-wing ideologues, it is barely hanging on. It is coming apart at the seams. What else, then? Prosperity, which, despite all efforts to avoid the bitter truth, is understood as the "increase of wealth". But where, in that case, is the traditional morality of that same middle class? Or, simply put, honesty? Significantly, the word "honesty" is nowhere to be found in the ideological vocabulary of either the right or the left. But let us return to family. It has to live somewhere decent, after all. Because for the English, at least, a family without its own home is a complete fiction. One of England’s far-left ideologues, London Mayor Ken Livingstone, says: "Today, an honest person in London cannot afford to buy a house or a flat." But who can? The speculators in the City, stockbrokers, the newly rich from the oil and computer businesses, and, it goes without saying, very wealthy foreigners (the latter being a hint towards the "national" side of this ideology). But you will agree—family, the increase of wealth (even if it were the most honest, if necessary!) is still too little, too insufficient for a British or any other national ideology. Well, okay. Let us try to give the floor to the Russians. But not the "new Russians", rather the more or less "old" ones, or those who, due to age or misfortune, were not lucky enough to become "new" ones. In today's Russia, everyone is bitterly complaining about the complete lack of a national ideology (never mind, they will eventually get one, and then they will regret it!). A week ago, a friend of mine from St Petersburg, a quite intelligent middle-aged man, formulated the question like this: can a Russian ideology emerge based on the complete cynicism that currently prevails in Russia? This question is no less illiterate than a question one might ask a cultured, middle-aged Englishman: can a British ideology emerge based on two values—family and "honest wealth creation"? A foolishness to which no reasonable answer can be given, because in both cases it is forgotten that a national ideology in every version of its own is a historical phenomenon. It does not fall from clear skies and does not disappear into the depths of the sea. It cannot simply be created or abolished, formulated or refuted. It can arise and exist only under specific historical conditions. And if such conditions exist, then a national ideology can arise based on anything—on moralism, amoralism, real facts, or the random caprice of someone's fantasy—but without these historical conditions, it cannot arise. I am not even talking about cases where, as an ideology emerges, its "moral" basis is a misunderstanding or a mistake, as happened with Roman ideology during the time of Augustus Octavian.

And we know that the most typical conditions for the emergence of a national ideology are either an extreme crisis or total collapse, or moments of national prosperity and triumph, especially when that nation is identified with a nation-state. Because for a nation and national self-awareness, the state very often provides the form. For example, it would not be an exaggeration to say that the emergence of the so-called "German ideology" as a historical phenomenon can be precisely dated to the first period of the Thirty Years' War, when all of Germany, then still fragmented into dozens of small states, was economically almost ruined, and the population decreased by a third. It is also no surprise that the first wave of what could be called a "Great Russian" national ideology surged in the most difficult months of 1812. It is also quite reasonable to say that Great Russian ideology (the shortest formulation: Orthodoxy, Autocracy, Nationality) developed precisely during the extremely difficult reign of Nicholas I, as the crisis grew in connection with the horrific "historical delay" in abolishing serfdom. And it would be quite banal to refer to the rise of German ideology after the victory in the Franco-Prussian War or the strengthening of French ideology after the defeat in that same war, or, finally, the rise of British imperial ideology during the Victorian era (when Disraeli placed the crown of Empress of India on Queen Victoria's head).

However, for a national ideology to arise, there is one more condition that is mandatory for the emergence of any ideology at all. I would call this condition "ideological tension". Ideological tension is characterized, first, by a large quantity of ideologies, and second, by the mutual irreconcilability of these ideologies. Peaceful coexistence or the absolute superiority of one ideology over others is not possible here. As the many ideologies develop, they will sooner or later polarize into a few, usually two, main political ideologies. However, while that has not yet happened, a period of ideological selection is necessary, preparation for a final and relentless ideological war, which does not by any means always subside when a war in the literal sense of the word ends. Such a time of ideological tension is characterized by the fact that phenomena of culture, religion, art, and even science become increasingly ideologized. More and more often, situations arise where everything that happens in the life of the human mind and culture must "become" an ideology. Moreover, ideology becomes what determines more and more not only an individual's life but also the lives of entire countries, societies, and, finally, all of humanity. Recalling the history of the Modern Era, one can assume that ideological tension arose during the Counter-Reformation (16th century) and developed during the Age of Enlightenment. A powerful impulse for it was the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars. But never in history—not only in European, but also in human history—has ideological tension been as intense and comprehensive as it became in the second half of the 19th century. Literally everything acquired ideological meaning. Furthermore, everything that could not or did not manage to become an ideology very quickly lost any other meaning as well. In such an atmosphere of previously unseen ideological tension, national ideologies sprang up like mushrooms after rain. Such simple words as nation, people, tribe—you did not manage to say or write them, but they already sounded nationally ideological. Furthermore, the very fact of perceiving these words, the fact that they were heard or read, was already part of a national ideology. (It is necessary to note here that very often a national ideology is swallowed by political ideology, although sometimes, when a political ideology arises, it immediately acquires national forms.) I think the culmination of this process was the 1930s to 1950s. In the sixties, with the failure of the "student revolution", the "great ideological decline" had already begun. In the seventies, "ideological fatigue" set in. Of course, one can also speak here of such de-ideologization factors as the gradual self-dissolution of the Soviet regime, the further collapse and fading of the Soviet empire, and then the end of the Cold War. But the main thing, I think, is not that. It can be assumed that certain invisible ideological resources were gradually exhausted, what one might call "ideological pressure" decreased, and—most importantly—the energy of the discovery, manifestation, and spread of ideological impulses ended, and that immediately reflected on national ideologies. Currently, we are witnesses to their general shrinking and withering away. In this regard, it may be added that in some countries, national ideologies are still vegetating, identifying themselves with religious ideologies (as in many Eastern countries with "Islamic fundamentalism", and in Russia and Yugoslavia—with Orthodoxy, which had long lost its social, cultural, and political significance). Yes indeed, Irish nationalist bombs are still going off in Ulster. The Irish are occasionally imitated by the Walloons in Belgium, the Albanians in Macedonia, the Tajiks and Kyrgyz dissatisfied with Uzbek pressure, or the Montenegrins dissatisfied with the Serbs in Yugoslavia. There is no doubt that all this will be enough for another good fifty years, but that is not the main thing. The main thing is that the era of Great Ideologies has come to an irreversible end.

Nowadays, it will not be so easy for a new national ideology to emerge. For it to arise, it will have to be "made", in other words, "invented", but to do that when there is no atmosphere of ideological tension is insanely difficult. It will be necessary to seek something new, something that could serve as a real stimulus for at least a local ideological tension. And, of course, this will not be able to happen without talented people, such as Hegel, Schelling, Gandhi, and even Chaadayev. People who would make the creation of such an ideology the work and goal of their lives.
Article first published in the August 2001 issue of the magazine Rīgas Laiks
Translated from Russian by Uldis Tīrons