The German company Helsing's HF-1 unmanned aerial vehicle combines an artificial-intelligence target-locking function with a plywood airframe that is impenetrable to radar waves.
The Helsing HF-1 "kamikaze drone" is an artificial-intelligence-guided attack unmanned aerial vehicle made of plywood, used by Ukraine's Special Operations Forces against Russian air defence systems at ranges of up to 50 kilometres. Germany has ordered 10,000 HF-1 units and the next-generation HX-2, choosing a non-metallic airframe not for reasons of cost (economy), but because it is "invisible" to radar.
"Smart" plywood drones have become one of the most influential weapons systems on the modern battlefield, with Ukraine's Special Operations Forces striking Russian defence systems at ranges of up to 50 kilometres using plywood "kamikaze drones" fitted with state-of-the-art artificial intelligence.
It is known that the Shahed-136 drones made in Iran from polystyrene foam and plywood forced US Patriot batteries to expend 943 interceptor missiles in four days, using up the volume of missiles produced by Lockheed Martin over 18 months. In the first six days of the conflict, Iranian forces had used 2,000 Shahed-136 units.
Defence Express was the first media team to observe the HF-1 in active use, as confirmed by defence force personnel operating in the Sumy region; there, the Helsing HF-1 drones of the Munich-based defence technology company have been in service since April last year.
The HF-1 plywood airframe is not an economical solution but a deliberate engineering decision that reduces the radar cross-section in a way that neither aluminium nor carbon fibre can. It is precisely this property, and not the drone's cost, that makes non-metallic construction the most effective material for unmanned aerial vehicles on both sides of the front.
"Our unmanned aerial vehicle is fitted with a target-seeking system that helps it acquire and lock on to the target until the target is reached," an unmanned aerial vehicle control operator with the call sign Romero told Defence Express. "If we lose contact with the unmanned aerial vehicle – either video or control – it still reaches the target and destroys it."
When Germany approved the Helsing order at the end of 2024, the drone production programme expanded considerably. Under a cooperation agreement that combines Ukrainian participation in manufacturing with direct supply from Germany, a contract has been concluded for the delivery of 4,000 HF-1 and 6,000 next-generation HX-2 "kamikaze drones". The total comes to 10,000 artificial-intelligence-equipped drones with plywood airframes. As early as the beginning of April 2025 it was confirmed that Ukraine had more than 1,000 HF-1 units at its disposal, with HX-2 deliveries scheduled by the end of the year.
Although the autonomous target-acquisition system is factory-fitted to every drone, its use in combat conditions has so far been deferred. At present, Ukrainian unmanned aerial vehicle operators guide each drone to a predetermined target and use the target-acquisition system only in the final stage.
"We can strike the enemy's equipment in places where they think they are safe," says an unmanned aerial vehicle unit commander with the call sign Destro, whose unit operates within the HF-1's optimal 45–50 kilometre operating radius. Analysis of strike video footage has confirmed the destruction of Pantsir-S1 short-range air defence systems and Buk-M3 radar units. This is equipment that the Russian army cannot quickly replace in fighting of the intensity currently taking place.
K. Bondara, a former policy adviser to the Ukrainian government who now works at the US Center for Strategic and International Studies, notes that the possibilities for combining unmanned aerial vehicles and artificial intelligence already exist, but their use on the battlefield remains limited: "Drones of that type can fly in laboratories, but in real life armed forces avoid using them, because the risk of error is too great." Special Operations Forces commanders in combat zones have reached the same conclusion: soldiers are not asking for full drone autonomy, but rather for more drones and more trained operators, in order to increase the intensity of strikes along the whole front.
Plywood drones are also assembled by Russian volunteers using parts manufactured in China: computer-controlled milling tools cut the frame components from 9 mm thick Chinese-made plywood, which are then sent to Russian positions on the Ukrainian front. On the Russian side of the front, the Molnya is a polystyrene foam and plywood platform launched by catapult. According to Ukrainian electronic warfare adviser Serhii Beskrestnov, since the end of 2025 the Molnya has been substantially modernised, incorporating machine-learning artificial intelligence, Starlink data transmission channels and rotating cameras with tenfold optical zoom. Whereas earlier versions of the unmanned aerial vehicle carried warheads, the modified models carry microcomputers and sensors that turn a cheap attack drone into a persistent ISR platform on a non-metallic airframe. Since January 2026, the Russians have been using these modified versions at the front.
On the battlefield, the use of these drones is most often recorded in Sumy and Donetsk. It should be stressed that Chinese-made birch plywood, which underpins Russian drone production, continues to flow into global timber markets despite prolonged pressure to apply sanctions. In 2024 Ukraine increased its plywood exports by 38%, and this product now accounts for more than 97% of all Ukrainian timber traded on European markets. According to data from Ukraine's National Security and Defence Council, by 2026 the Ukrainian drone manufacturing industry had reached a production capacity of more than 8 million units a year, an unprecedented figure for a country at war.