Finland's Competition and Consumer Authority (KKV) has proposed fines of more than €9 million against the largest companies in the wild berry sector, after officials uncovered a long-running nationwide cartel that affected wild berry prices for a decade.
KKV representatives said that between 2013 and 2023, five of the country's largest wild berry companies coordinated the prices paid to berry pickers while exchanging commercially sensitive market information relating to the sale of frozen berries. The berries in question are bilberries, lingonberries and cloudberries picked in Finland's forests. Wild berry picking relies heavily on seasonal foreign labour, particularly workers from Thailand.
KKV said that during the berry harvesting seasons, the companies coordinated purchase prices by phone, text message and WhatsApp. Officials explain that the arrangement reduced competition and allowed berry pickers to be paid less, since competing firms offered similar rates.
KKV has asked the Market Court to impose fines totalling roughly €9.4 million on Arctic International, Kaskein Marja, Marja Bothnia Berries and Polarica, noting that Kiantama, which was also party to the arrangement, avoided a fine by cooperating with investigators and helping to expose the cartel.
"This conduct was a serious and long-running breach of competition law," KKV director-general Kirsi Leivo said at a press conference in Helsinki. "It directly harmed berry pickers and weakened competition in the market."
According to KKV, the companies involved controlled roughly 80% of Finland's domestic wild berry purchasing market in 2023 and nearly 78% of the frozen berry wholesale market. The largest proposed fine targets Polarica and its related companies, at almost €6 million. Marja Bothnia Berries faces a proposed fine of around €1.8 million, while Arctic International and its related companies face a fine of around €970,000. Kaskein Marja faces a separate proposed fine of around €785,000.
Final ruling rests with Finland's Market Court
KKV said the investigation began in 2022, in cooperation with the National Bureau of Investigation and regional labour authorities. During the investigation, officials carried out raids at the premises of the companies involved in Finland and Sweden.
The authority reviewed around 20,000 documents, including roughly 8,800 text messages and WhatsApp messages exchanged between company representatives. Research director Pekka Matila stressed that mobile communications played a central role in the investigation: "This is the first time that mobile device communications have played such a significant part in one of our cartel investigations."
The companies were most likely aware that their conduct was questionable, since they often avoided official written correspondence. KKV was unable to identify any single company or manager who had initiated the arrangement. Matila noted that the practice appears to have become an entrenched way of working in the sector over time. "It looks as though this has been going on in the industry for years."
Kiantama said it cooperated closely with the authorities throughout the investigation; its chief executive, Janne Piikivi, said that since the case came to light the company has introduced staff training and updated its internal procedures. Had it not cooperated, Kiantama would have faced a fine of around €1.4 million. The case came to light under Finland's so-called leniency system (leniency system), which allows companies involved in cartels to receive a reduced fine or immunity if they help expose the illegal conduct.
Several companies rejected the accusations. Polarica said KKV's findings were unfounded, arguing there was no evidence of unlawful competition. The company pointed to an earlier investigation by the Swedish Competition Authority (Konkurrensverket), which examined similar conduct in Sweden and imposed no fines.
Marja Bothnia Berries also denied any wrongdoing; the company's chief executive, Tommy Gustafsson, said the communication between berry companies reflected normal market practice in a sector where the prices paid to pickers are publicly visible: "It is strange that the Finnish authorities interpret a transparent way of operating as a serious competition breach lasting more than a decade, while the Swedish authorities regarded similar conduct as normal industry practice."
KKV said it could not determine whether the alleged cartel had a direct effect on consumer prices. Officials explained that the arrangement mainly concerned the prices paid to berry pickers and the frozen berry wholesale trade, rather than the retail products sold to consumers. Studies cited by KKV indicate that cartels often raise prices by 10-30% above normal market levels.
In recent years Finland's berry industry has faced increased scrutiny over labour practices and allegations of corruption linked to the recruitment of pickers abroad. Several executives associated with the companies named in the cartel investigation have also faced separate criminal investigations over alleged human trafficking and bribery.
A former chief executive of Kiantama, Vernu Vasunta, received a substantial prison sentence in 2025 for human trafficking involving Thai berry pickers, though the ruling is not yet final. A former chief executive of Polarica, Jukka Kristo, has also faced allegations of human trafficking involving dozens of workers from Thailand. Separate investigations linked to Arctic International have been referred to prosecutors. All those charged in these criminal cases have denied wrongdoing.
The Market Court will review KKV's proposal before deciding whether the companies breached Finland's competition laws and whether fines should be imposed.
Cartels in Europe - a widespread problem
Cartels and price coordination are not uncommon in Europe's food, agriculture and consumer goods sectors. As in Finland's berry case, companies elsewhere secretly collude to artificially control markets and boost profits at the expense of producers, suppliers or consumers.
There are several striking cartels across Europe, similar to Finland's case, in which competition regulators have imposed enormous fines.
One was the so-called canned vegetables cartel, in which three large vegetable processing companies - Bonduelle, Coroos and Groupe CECAB - coordinated prices and divided up market shares for more than 13 years. The companies fixed prices and traded commercially sensitive information about the sale of canned green beans, peas and sweetcorn to supermarket chains. In 2019 the European Commission imposed a combined fine of €31.6 million on the companies. Bonduelle avoided a fine entirely because it was the first to report the cartel, just as Kiantama did in Finland's berry case.
The second most prominent case was a cartel among organic food distributors in France. Three specialist organic food distributors entered into an arrangement that lasted more than seven years. The companies secretly divided their organic food brands between specialist eco-shops and ordinary supermarkets. The aim was to ensure the same brands were not available through both retail channels, denying consumers the chance to compare products and prices. The French Competition Authority (Autorité de la concurrence) fined the companies €12.67 million.
Meanwhile, the "savoury snack brands cartel" in Italy was formed by three leading Italian snack manufacturers - Amica Chips, Pata and Preziosi Food - which divided up the product market in this way. The companies coordinated their activities as well as the prices of crisps and other savoury snacks they manufactured for supermarkets' private labels. The aim was to maintain higher sale prices and reduce competition between them. Italy's competition authority, AGCM, imposed fines totalling just over €23 million on the companies.
The food packaging manufacturers' cartel involved several producers and distributors supplying polystyrene and rigid plastic trays for packaging meat, fish and cheese in supermarkets. The cartel operated for eight years; its members fixed prices, allocated customers and engaged in bid-rigging and collusive tendering, which directly affected the costs faced by food producers and supermarkets. After lengthy litigation and appeals, the General Court of the European Union upheld multi-million-euro fines against the companies involved, for example upholding a €9.44 million fine against the CCPL group.
One of the longest-running cartels ever recorded in Europe was the animal feed phosphates cartel, which operated in the agriculture and animal feed sector for more than 30 years. Ten large companies coordinated sale prices and divided market quotas for chemical additives used in animal feed, artificially inflating livestock farming costs across Europe. The European Commission imposed a substantial fine of €175 million for this cartel.
The leniency programme (leniency system)...
...is a tool used by competition authorities that offers full immunity or a substantial fine reduction to a cartel member who is the first to voluntarily report the breach and provide evidence.
This system operates both at European Union level and in individual countries, including here in Latvia, as well as in Finland, where, as mentioned, it was used by Kiantama.
The programme exists to "break" the secrecy. Cartels are secret arrangements. Without inside information, they are very difficult to uncover. The programme creates an "atmosphere of distrust" among cartel members. Every company knows that if someone else reports first, that company will receive immunity while the rest face the maximum fine. It also allows the state to gather evidence - emails, messages, minutes and so on - more quickly and cheaply.
One of the programme's key provisions is full immunity - a 100% reduction of the fine. This can only be granted to the very first company to approach the authority and provide sufficient evidence for the competition regulator to begin proving the breach. This is exactly why, in Finland's berry case, the €1.4 million fine facing Kiantama was waived in full.
Fine reductions also apply to subsequent companies, under the so-called queue principle. Companies that apply after the first to report can no longer receive full immunity, but their fines can be reduced if they submit additional evidence of "significant added value". The second company can receive a 30-50% reduction, the third 20-30%. Other companies that actively cooperate can receive a reduction of up to 20%.
For the programme to apply, a company must meet strict criteria. It must withdraw from the cartel immediately, unless the authority asks it not to yet, so as not to alert the other members. It must submit all documents, and nothing may be concealed or destroyed. If the company used force or threats to compel others to join the cartel, it cannot receive full immunity.
What about Latvia?
The leniency programme works in much the same way in Latvia, where it is one of the main weapons the Competition Council (KP) has in the fight against secret cartels. Latvia's system has some important nuances and "bonuses" that matter to companies even more than the fine itself.
If a company has missed its chance to use the leniency programme and the KP has already gathered evidence, Latvia also has a settlement procedure. If the company admits guilt, does not dispute the facts and undertakes to litigate the matter, it can receive a fixed 10% reduction of the fine.
For a long time there was a major gap in Latvian legislation - only the company itself (the legal entity) could be punished, with a fine of up to 10% of turnover. The executives and board members who actually organised the cartels personally went unpunished. Now the legal framework has changed radically.
The Saeima has adopted amendments to the Criminal Law that finally establish criminal liability for individuals over prohibited agreements, or cartel formation, in public procurement. This means that company executives, procurement specialists and project managers now face a real prison sentence for deliberately coordinating prices and preparing sham bids.
Until now, such measures had faced strong opposition from some politicians and business organisations, who feared "unwarranted criminal proceedings" being launched. Pressure from law enforcement agencies and public outrage, for example following the large-scale builders' cartel scandal, ultimately prevailed.
Even if a case does not result in a prison sentence, company executives in Latvia now face serious financial consequences.
If a company uses the leniency programme and is the first to report a cartel, exemption from punishment applies not only to the company but also to its employees. Reporting to the Competition Council protects the company's executive from criminal prosecution and imprisonment. If the executive does not report and the authority uncovers the cartel itself, the company pays an administrative fine, but the executive personally ends up in the dock in criminal proceedings.
The new arrangements in Latvia are designed to eliminate entirely the practice whereby, once a cartel is exposed, company executives simply abandon the penalised firm, set up a new one, and carry on operating in the same manner.