Why can a fake peace be worse than a prolonged war?

On 26 July, the European Union announced an agreement on gas supplies; its goal was to demonstrate the unity of member states in their attitude towards Russia. Under this agreement, EU countries planned to reduce gas consumption by 15% between August and March, thereby helping to prevent a crisis in the winter, showing solidarity, and limiting Russia's ability to influence Europe's energy supply. On the surface, this was another demonstration of the united front that Europe has largely maintained since the beginning of the war. In reality, however, these cuts are voluntary, and individual countries have used certain exemptions from the aforementioned agreement, which makes one wonder how significant it will be, especially if a natural gas shortage affects some countries far more than others.

Six months after Russia's invasion of Ukraine, there are signs that Europe is struggling to stay its course in an increasingly expensive war. With inflation rising, the energy crisis worsening, and the threat of recession growing, European leaders are speaking ever more loudly about the socio-economic, as well as political and geopolitical, consequences of the conflict. At the same time, beneath the expressions of external consensus, tensions are brewing over the final resolution of the war. For example, Germany has been hesitant with promised arms shipments to Ukraine. In Italy, where Prime Minister Mario Draghi's coalition government has fallen, there is growing political opposition among the country's populist parties to military support for Kyiv. And although five packages of sanctions were approved in a flash, Europeans argued for weeks over the sixth package of sanctions targeting Russian oil, which was halted by an internal EU autocrat, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán.

These processes bring a much more serious question to the fore: how long can European unity on the war issue last, and what could cause it to collapse? In reality, the greatest threat to the European coalition might not be a lack of progress in ending the heightened violence in Ukraine, as has been the case so far, but rather a relative silence in the conflict that could allow Moscow to entice some EU countries into pressuring Kyiv to concede, especially if the energy crisis continues to deepen. Paradoxically, by giving in to illusions of peace, Europe and the rest of the West could cause the war to drag on at everyone's expense.

The return of the populists

In the early stages of the war, the European Union showed remarkable resolve. Brussels, never known for the speed of its reaction, was able to approve the most extensive sanctions ever implemented within a matter of weeks. Governments of European countries quickly increased defence measures, with Germany announcing an additional €100 billion in military spending and the EU, for the first time, facilitating the transfer of weapons to a third party. Europe agreed to grant temporary protection to millions of Ukrainian citizens, including freedom to move and work throughout the EU. In June, the European Council officially granted Ukraine and Moldova candidate status for the EU, while Georgia was granted potential candidate status pending reforms. For most of the spring, the new dynamic of European action seemed to confirm German Chancellor Olaf Scholz's assertion that the Russian invasion was a Zeitenwende, or turning point, and that Europeans were ready to face it.

Since then, Brussels' activity has waned. Although EU countries eventually agreed, for example, on an oil embargo against Russia, it happened with a significant time lag, which may have allowed Russia to adjust to the situation. Despite the recently concluded agreement on gas saving, a true gas embargo has not yet been implemented. In fact, we are not seeing an EU gas embargo against Russia, but rather it is Moscow that has turned off the gas to Europe. Six countries – Bulgaria, Denmark, Finland, Latvia, Poland, the Netherlands, and Finland – have had their Russian gas supplies completely cut off. Moreover, the Russian state energy company Gazprom has drastically reduced gas flow to the rest of Europe. Nordstream I, the largest pipeline through which Russian gas is delivered to Europe and which is largely owned by Gazprom, was temporarily shut down in July for maintenance. It has resumed operations, but gas exports have fallen to 20% of the contracted volume, and further disruptions are expected. Instead of agreeing on new sanctions, the EU is trying to address gas storage problems in many countries and is struggling to limit gas consumption. To diversify supplies, it is seeking new energy partnerships with the US, the Middle East, Africa, and the Caucasus. The International Monetary Fund estimates that if the supply of Russian gas to Europe were completely cut off, the economies of some countries, including the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, and Italy, could shrink by more than 5%. It will be a cold and expensive winter. (...)