Lifeless arguments. "Some questions may seem quite ordinary and possible to us, while others – unusual and extravagant" - Zeme un valsts

Lifeless arguments. "Some questions may seem quite ordinary and possible to us, while others – unusual and extravagant"

62% of philosophers are atheists, but the proportion of atheists in academic philosophical circles is significantly higher (in fact, almost twice as high). (Atheism, in my opinion, is the belief that a person like the God of theistic religions does not exist.) Do philosophers know something that others in academia do not? What could it be? Philosophers (unlike those in other fields) often have to address theistic arguments, i.e., arguments for the existence of God. My guess is that most philosophers consider these arguments to be fallacious. [..] The flaws in these arguments (if they are indeed flaws) may be a good basis for agnosticism, not atheism.

Alvin Plantinga in an interview with Gary Gutting, http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/02/09/is-atheism-irrational/

Plantinga and his interviewer Gary Gutting refer to a survey conducted in late 2009 by David Chalmers and David Bourget (the survey results and analysis can be found here). The study surveyed 1,972 philosophers working at leading philosophy departments in the USA, the UK, and Europe. Philosophers were asked about their positions on various areas of philosophy, including belief in God. The results show that 14.6% of philosophers consider themselves theists (10.6% are convinced of it, while 4% lean towards that view), 72.8% consider themselves atheists (61.9% of those surveyed are convinced of this, while 11% lean toward this view), and 12% replied that they do not have a firm view on this issue, i.e., they are agnostics. It is worth noting that most respondents who consider themselves theists work in the philosophy of religion and follow a libertarian position on the question of free will, i.e., they believe that our choices are free from the determinism of the physical world. Conversely, most atheists are naturalists and believe that mental processes can be explained through physical processes. These correlations are not surprising. But what about the number of atheists – is it really significantly higher compared to scientists in other fields? Yes and no. In a study published some time ago by Edward Larson and Larry Witham, 45.3% of US scientists identified themselves as non-believers (compared to 39.3% who are believers), which seemingly aligns with Plantinga's observation that the number of atheists among philosophers is almost twice as high. However, the data mentioned relates to all US scientists. If the respondent group is narrowed to look only at the views of leading US scientists (those who are members of the National Academy of Sciences), it turns out that the proportion of non-believers increases significantly; namely, 72% of leading US scientists state that they do not believe in God (compared to 7% of believers). Given that researchers and faculty from the most prestigious philosophy departments participated in the Chalmers and Bourget survey, 72% of atheist philosophers perhaps do not state anything essential about academic philosophy itself, but rather highlight a common trend in academia.

Of course, in surveys of this kind, one must always account for the role played by the way questions are asked, which to a certain extent also determines how the respondents understand the terms used in the question. Plantinga's objection that a person who rejects the arguments for God's existence has no reason to conclude from that that God does not exist seems justified in one sense. If from the assertion that there are no arguments for the existence of aliens, I conclude that there are no aliens, then I can be accused of committing a logical fallacy because I have based my conclusion on the unknown. It should be added that I would commit the exact same error if, from the assertion that there are no arguments against the existence of aliens, I concluded that aliens do exist. In both cases, I have the right to claim only that I do not know; i.e., on the question of the existence of aliens, I am an agnostic. Only one must also take into account that similar considerations will apply to the theist – they would have the right to claim that God exists only if that belief is well-founded. Moreover, not all cases are the same. In the Chalmers and Bourget survey, terms were not defined, and philosophers had to choose one of three options that best described their position – “theist,” “atheist,” or “undecided = agnostic.” But what does it mean to be, for example, an atheist as opposed to someone who is undecided, or an agnostic? Suppose I have thought about the existence of aliens and cannot decide whether they exist or not. On one hand, it seems that given the vast size of the Universe, the existence of other living beings cannot be ruled out. On the other – we have no evidence for the existence of such beings. Therefore, I cannot deny the existence of these beings, but there is also no basis to say that they do exist. Consequently, one could say that on this issue I am an agnostic. But now let us look at another case. Imagine someone asks me if I agree that mushrooms are alien spies? I could say that is nonsense, yet – can I prove that it is not? It seems I cannot. But does that mean I must ultimately admit that in this case, too, I am an agnostic? I think not. But how does this case differ from the previous one? Some questions (considering our set of beliefs) may seem quite ordinary and possible to us, while others – unusual and extravagant. Many possibilities we usually do not even consider for the reason that, against the background of all our other beliefs, they do not qualify as possibilities that could be realized; they are in some sense not live to us, we have not thought about them. It could be said that most people are not occupied by the question of the existence of Zeus. Do they have a basis to say they are a-Zeusists? Yes. But do they have arguments against the existence of Zeus? Certainly not. Otherwise, we would be forced to admit that we have a basis to deny something only if we have strong arguments at our disposal. Thus, what makes different cases distinct is the respondent’s initial position – if I do not view the existence of Zeus as a possibility, then that does not make me an agnostic. Conversely, if someone were to come forward with the claim that Zeus exists, then the truth of that claim would have to be decided, not by whether we can prove the opposite, but by whether it can be substantiated with evidence.

In that case, we can view the answers of the surveyed philosophers in at least two different ways. One was already highlighted by Plantinga, namely, it is possible that philosophers know something that Plantinga does not – strong arguments that support the belief that God does not exist. However, there is another possibility – for academic philosophers who consider themselves atheists, theism has no real possibility. In that case, quoting the American comedian Bill Maher, atheism is a position in the same way that abstinence is a sex position.
The article was first published in the March 2014 issue of Rīgas Laiks magazine

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