"So, we have entered the age of the principate... Many confuse the principate with a dictatorship and are afraid."
Grigory Revzin, Gentlemen's Quarterly No. 12, 2007
The Russian state has performed one of the most shameful self-manipulations of recent years, and Russian society has received it with its customary mute indifference, just as it has all previous insults from the authorities. Operation "successor", which was carried out at lightning speed in two days, this banal two-move combination which resulted in a new state president (even before the elections) and a new prime minister (with the old one continuing to work), destroys any illusions about what the current power in Russia is most interested in. More than anything in the world, the current power in Russia is interested in power. A sad tautology.
Only the West – politicians, experts and journalists – showed enthusiasm
One member of the German government expressed satisfaction that Medvedev had not appeared in all the brilliance of the incoming power (like Athena Pallas) from the depths of the Federal Security Service. Some experts hinted at the potential liberalism of the successor, while sensation-hungry journalists began to discuss the most incredible scenarios for the development of events.
It is not that this excitement did not affect the Russian media at all: in the Russian political internet (well, where else?), for several days, the article by well-known art critic Grigory Revzin in Gentlemen’s Quarterly was discussed, where the emerging Russian political regime was compared to the Augustan principate. Interestingly, none of the many debaters paid attention to where Revzin’s article was published – GQ had appeared in a completely uncharacteristic role, as almost the only "paper platform" for the free expression of political opinion. This speaks of the current (almost voluntarily accepted) humiliation of the Russian press and society much more eloquently than all the articles, no matter how sophisticated the historical parallels discovered in them may be. I remember that during the Soviet era, semi-forbidden texts could occasionally be found in the most exotic publications, such as, let's say, Literaturnaya Gruziya or the magazine Nauka i zhizn.
But that is, so to speak, the view from within. From the outside, the situation looks both much more interesting and much simpler. One can complain endlessly about the standards of Western democracy, reproaching Europe and America that these standards are double, that Westerners do not understand the reality of Russia, etc., but that does not change the clear and final diagnosis of Russia's December events. Here is their sad
list: the seeds of democratic institutions have been trampled; any democratic procedures have been deliberately compromised; an independent judicial system and press do not exist; the opposition is suppressed by any method, including blackmail and threats of physical retaliation. Private property as a social institution no longer exists – because one cannot call "private" property that belongs to a citizen only conditionally, until the first move of the Leviathan. Power is shared among themselves by cynical businessmen and former (of course, also current) special services personnel, who feel only contempt for society. Society itself – mostly being fearful, xenophobic, and sick with a consumer fever – is indeed deserving of contempt. It is upon this coincidence between contempt and being contemptible that the current so-called "stability" in Russia is based.
A banal conclusion, you will say. That is true. But it has never been said anywhere that "banal" means "incorrect". Of course, it is much more pleasant to talk about Augustan principates and the "views of the consolidated elite" in connection with crude political tricks and manifestations of low-level cynicism. But in the analysis of the situation, the main thing is by no means to use any "special", "clever" words; one only needs to put the "ordinary" ones in the appropriate order. Wittgenstein wrote about this, asserting that the task of philosophy is not to discover something new, but to sort out the old. This is very well understood by many of the Western journalists who write about Russia – but not those who, every time Putin is mentioned, attach the word "tsar" to him (this branch of journalism was clearly demonstrated by the famous Christiane Amanpour, whose pompous documentary "Tsar Putin" was recently shown on CNN). Thinking by analogy is wretched thinking, said Merab Mamardashvili; journalism is going further and further along this smooth path, now even comparing Putin to Ivan the Terrible (why not Boris Godunov then?), Lukashenko to Mussolini, and just now in some "analytical" article about the prospects of "successor Medvedev" I already stumbled upon the word "thaw". It should be noted that every historical analogy as if "legitimizes" even the most repulsive "present": the "past" has already happened and gained completeness; by equating to it the "present" changing before our eyes, we give this second one a genealogy that seemingly justifies it. A dog with a pedigree is valued higher than a stray mutt; on the label of every newly invented beer brand, it will certainly be readable that it is "brewed according to ancient recipes", "has been produced since the 17th century", etc. Historical analogy turns political analysis at worst into an apology, at best into a publicity stunt.
The article was first published in the January 2008 issue of Rīgas Laiks magazine



