As long as ideology is more important than mathematics, Europeans will not escape the energy crisis - Zeme un valsts

As long as ideology is more important than mathematics, Europeans will not escape the energy crisis

With winter approaching, Europe is prepared “to throw itself off a cliff”

Facing its most severe energy crisis since the Second World War, as the heating (autumn, winter) season begins, Europe (the EU) continues to dither. The President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen (Ursula von der Leyen), has introduced a series of new European Union energy policy measures, including planned price caps, additional taxes on energy producers, the creation of a new European Hydrogen Bank, and new support for electric vehicles. Meanwhile, European Union member states are nationalising utility companies, setting electricity prices, and subsidising consumers. However, such EU actions do not signify a significant retreat from the policies that led the continent to its serious energy problems.

The biggest obstacle to a successful resolution of the issue is the fact that Europe still refuses to see the causes of its energy security crisis, choosing to blame external forces for the current situation. U. von der Leyen and other European leaders cite Russia and its war against Ukraine as the main reason for Europe’s energy problems. The closure of natural gas pipelines or the “turning off of the gas taps” by Russian President Vladimir Putin has undoubtedly worsened the situation, but... this will be the third winter of Europe’s energy crisis. Already in the winters of 2020-2021 and 2021-2022, Europe experienced a significant rise in electricity and natural gas prices, as well as gas shortages, which, in turn, triggered an increase in the use of coal and fuel oil. European policymakers either paid no attention to this or chose not to change course.

As long as enough people in Europe and elsewhere believe that the continent’s energy problems are only related to V. Putin, it is useful to clearly and understandably identify the policy directions that led Europe to this crisis. Understanding the roots and causes of the problem is the first step towards solving it.

The European crisis has been “in the making” for two decades. European policymakers, in an attempt to achieve a rapid transition from fossil fuels and nuclear energy to renewable energy sources, forced countries and businesses to make significant changes to energy supply. At the same time, these same policymakers ignored forecasts for a constant demand for oil and natural gas, as well as the need for a reliable baseload fuel source to support intermittent solar and wind energy. Many EU member states reduced domestic fossil fuel production and restricted imports, except for Russian natural gas. Germany, which itself has significant gas deposits, just like France and other countries, banned coal mining. In the last decade, natural gas production in Europe has decreased by 50%, and currently, its imports account for 83% of European gas consumption.

As a result of pressure from various activists and green parties, Germany and several other countries also decided to phase out zero-carbon nuclear energy, despite its impeccable safety record. Today, Europe’s proposed gas and electricity price caps, as well as new levies on energy producers, will further reduce (stifle) supply while attempting to shield consumers from high prices that might encourage them to turn down the heat and switch off (conserve) the lights.

Europe’s policy and desire to block gas supplies created a deficit that began to cause price hikes two winters ago. Believing that it would soon be able to do without natural gas, Europe has also blocked long-term import contracts in various ways, as a result of which the EU is suffering from a gas famine, even though the world’s largest gas reserves are found all around it – not only in Russia but also in North Africa, Central Asia, and other regions. The EU could quite easily have secured access to reliable gas supply sources, and at affordable prices, but now Europe is dependent on the expensive spot market. Even today, while European officials are seeking new volumes of gas supplies, they stubbornly refuse to sign long-term contracts with the approached natural gas producers. We recently experienced another clear example: two years after the start of Europe’s energy crisis and seven months after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz (Olaf Scholz) returned from a trip to Qatar and the United Arab Emirates having concluded an agreement for only one cargo of liquefied natural gas, rather than for the long-term supplies that the country desperately needs to ensure heat for its citizens and the operation of its factories.

Europe, at its political level, has still not realised the consequences of its decision ten years ago to turn away from natural gas. Throughout both the 1990s and the 2000s, natural gas consumption grew the fastest in Europe and elsewhere in the world. Gas was in demand thanks to its relatively low emissions and its very competitive price at the time. The shift from coal to natural gas was the fastest and cheapest way to reduce carbon emissions: thanks to the shale gas revolution, carbon emissions in the United States fell rapidly without government intervention. However, about a decade ago, the part of the public opposed to fossil fuels intensified anti-natural gas campaigns. The result: Europe gradually discontinued long-term gas supply contracts.

In European energy policy, ideology, unfortunately, is more important than mathematics. Discontinuing the use of nuclear energy and hard coal, and limiting the use of natural gas, while reducing the volume of renewable energy production, will, of course, lead to an energy shortage. Moreover, all the supposedly positive and commendable attempts to achieve a faster transition to wind and solar energy (renewable energy) do not take into account the significant limitations of these resources and extraction technologies. Sources for harvesting solar and wind energy require sufficiently large land use, critically important materials and equipment (including from China), as well as reserve capacity or storage, which do not yet exist in nature. Finally, the forced transition from one type of energy production to another, organised by policymakers, ignores forecasts for constant demand for fossil fuels, including for transport, industry, and heating, as well as for providing reserve energy for unpredictable wind and solar power.

As long as ideology is more important than mathematics, Europeans will not escape the energy crisis

Comments

Harijs
1. Tīši vai netīši - nelietojiet definīciju "enerģētiskā krīze". Enerģētiskās krīzes definīcija ir noteikta (vismaz Latvijā) ar MK 19.04.2011. noteikumiem Nr. 312. Mums vēl neviens lietotājs nevienu stundu nav sēdējis bez elektrības. Mums ir nenormāli paaugstinātas enerģijas cenas, un krīze var rasties patērētāju finansēs. 2. Mums cenu veido tirgus operators NordPool savā reģionā, cenu veidošanas metodika man nav ne zināma (tā ir slepena), ne saprotama. Piemēram, šorīt Zviedrijas ziemeļos cenu apgabals SE1 eksportē pāri par 2000 MW no savām lētajām hidroelektrostacijām, bet viņu cena ir pāri par 300 euro par MWh - kādēļ? Protams, mums Latvijā ir gandrīz 500 eiro par MWh. Bet NordPool eksportē ārpus savām robežām 1000-2000 MW - tātad ir enerģijas pārpalikums. 3. Manuprāt, cenu kāpumu ir injicējusi ES ar savu tehniski un ekonomiski nepamatoto "zaļo kursu" un atomenerģijas noliegšanu enerģijas ražotāju un, iespējams, arī valdību interesēs.

Add a comment